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APPEALING TO THE LEGISLATURE: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE GEORGIA STATUTES REGARDING
EVIDENCE PRESERVATION AND ACCESS TO
POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING
Joy D. Aceves-Amaya*
A right of access to evidence for tests which, given the particular crime
for which the individual was convicted and the evidence that was offered by

the government at trial in support of the defendant's guilt, could prove beyond any doubt that the individual in fact did not commit the crime, is constitutionally required, I believe, as a matter of basic fairness.'
DNA evidence testing is the leading cause of exonerations in criminal cases
throughout the United States.2 Yet, without the preservation of evidence in these
cases and the ability to subject this evidence to advancing technology in DNA
testing, many claims of innocence go unheard and defendants remain incarcerated while the real perpetrators of crime go unpunished.

As of September 2009, seven Georgia men have been exonerated by postconviction DNA testing.3 Such exonerations should be considered "victories for

our criminal justice system: they free the innocent, correct miscarriages of justice
that undermine public confidence in our criminal justice system, and allow the
pursuit of the real perpetrators of heinous crimes to commence.",4 The purpose of
this paper is to offer a comparative analysis of Georgia's current evidence preservation and post-conviction DNA testing statutes with a model policy offered by
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law.
Ms. Aceves-Amaya, Articles Editor of the University of the District of Columbia David Clarke
School of Law Law Review, would like to thank John Terzano, Adjunct Professor of Law, University
of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law and President, The Justice Project, for
instructing the next generation of attorneys on how to avoid wrongful convictions. The author also
wishes to thank the committed attorneys of the Atlanta Circuit Public Defender's Office for their
encouragement as well as Emilio Aceves-Amaya for his unwavering support.
1 Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 315 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc).
2 Samuel L. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005).

3 The Innocence Project, Georgia Exonerations, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/state.
php?state=GA (last visited Nov. 28, 2008) (the exonerated individuals are: Calvin Johnson (1999);
Douglas Echols (2002); Samuel Scott (2002); Clarence Harrison (2004); Robert Clark (2005), Willie
Williams (2007) and John Jerome White (2007)).
4 Rachel Steinbeck, The Fightfor Post-Conviction DNA Testing is Not Over Yet: An Analysis of
the Eight Remaining "HoldoutStates" and Suggestions for Strategies to Bring Vital Relief to the Wrongfully Convicted, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 332 (2007).
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The Justice Project, a bi-partisan criminal justice reform organization. 5 The additional provisions advocated by the policy model not only protect criminal defendants from wrongful incarceration, but also allows law enforcement agencies and
prosecutors an increased time frame to pursue unsolved homicides and other violent crimes. Many of these unsolved crimes are the result6 of the positive outcomes of post-conviction DNA testing in innocence claims.
By offering this comparison, the hope is to encourage the General Assembly
to consider additional statutory provisions designed to ensure that wrongful convictions and claims of innocence are promptly addressed in Georgia's legal system; thus enabling law enforcement agencies and prosecutors to locate and
convict those truly responsible for the crimes for which others may be
incarcerated.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2003, Georgia was on the forefront of enacting legislation regarding evidence preservation and procedures for access to post-conviction DNA testing. 7
The legislation was enacted on the heels of the exonerations of three Georgia
men. 8 As of February 2003, 114 men nationwide had been released after DNA
testing absolved them of their crimes. Lieutenant Governor Mark Taylor and
Senator David Adelman, in cooperation with the Prosecuting Attorneys' Council,
the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI), the Georgia Innocence Project (GIP)
and the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys (GACDL), introduced SB 119 to allow Georgia law to keep pace with technological advances in
DNA testing and "insure that innocent people are not kept in prison for serious

5 The Justice Project lobbies for reforms on both the national and state level addressing significant flaws in the American criminal justice system, as well as works to increase public awareness of
needed reforms.
6 News Advisory, The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Georgia, Department
of Justice Helps With "Cold Cases" in Georgia (Apr. 30, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/gan/press/
2005/04-30-2005.html (in 2005, the District Attorney's Office in Fulton County, Georgia received
$714,150 from the Department of Justice, part of President Bush's DNA initiative, Advancing Justice
Through DNA Technology, to help solve old, unsolved "cold" cases and to identify the missing using
DNA evidence).
7 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-55 (2009) (custody of evidence in criminal cases); § 17-5-56 (2009)
(preservation of evidence collected at crime scenes); § 17-5-71 (2009) (specific to evidence in sexual
assault cases); § 5-5-41(c) (2009) (motion for performance of forensic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
testing).
8 Melissa Rife, Searches and Seizures: Provide Extraordinary Appeals and Motions for New
Trial Based on Request for DNA Testing and Analysis; Establish Proceduresfor Preservationof Evidence, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 119-20 (2003) (the men exonerated before the proposed statutes were
Calvin Johnson (1999), Douglas Echols (2002), and Samuel Scott (2002)).
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crimes they did not commit." 9 The bill enjoyed the broadest support ever encoun-

tered for a criminal law-related statute in Georgia.1"
II.

PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE

Every jurisdiction has an administrative policy or practice regarding the collec-

tion and storage of evidence collected by the government in criminal cases; however, few states mandate the preservation of evidence.'1 As of August 2009, only
twenty-six states, as well as the District of Columbia and12 the federal government,
compel the preservation of evidence in criminal cases.
A.

Exonerations Made Possible by Evidence Preservation

Luckily for Calvin Johnson, the first defendant exonerated by DNA evidence

in Georgia after serving sixteen years of a life sentence for rape, the evidence in
his case was retained past the time period allowed by the statute currently in
place.13 Johnson was convicted of rape in Cobb County in 1983.'4 He made a
motion for a new trial that was denied in 1984 and his conviction was affirmed in
1989.15 In 1994, Johnson made an extraordinary motion for a new trial in order to
16
obtain the rape kit so that DNA testing could be conducted.
In 1997, a laboratory analyzed the samples it received; however, the testing
17
appeared not to be relevant to establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Forensic Science Associates, an independent laboratory, later conducted PCRbased DNA testing on a swab and slides from the rape kit and issued a report
that concluded that Johnson was not the source of the material. 18 A judge ordered a new trial for Johnson in 1999 and the district attorney dropped all
9 Id. at 119.
10 Id. at 120 (SB 119 was passed unanimously by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives).
11 Cynthia Jones, Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost. The Preservationof BiologicalEvidence
Under Innocence Protection Statutes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1242-44 (2005).
12 Innocence Project, Fact Sheet: Preservation of Evidence, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/253.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2009) (the 26 states are: Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin). See also D.C. Code § 5-113.32 (2009);
The Innocence Protection Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600A (2009).
13 Kathy Lohr, Exonerated Prisoners Adjust to Life on the Outside (Feb. 27, 2007), http://www.
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=7567797.
14 Id.
15 Innocence Project, Georgia Exonerations: Calvin Johnson, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/186.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2009).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
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charges after reviewing the test results. 19 However, at any point between 1989
and 1994, due to the window of time between his direct appeal and post-conviction motions, the evidence in Johnson's case could have been rightfully destroyed
by the custodian and an innocent man would remain incarcerated today.
Likewise, in 1987, Clarence Harrison was convicted of rape and sentenced to
life in prison; yet he consistently maintained his innocence. 20 In 1988, at the request of the public defender's office, slides from the rape kit were sent to a commercial laboratory for DNA analysis. However, the lab was unable to perform
adequate testing on the slides due to the limited technology available at that
time.21
In 2003, when the Georgia Innocence Project (GIP) assigned two law students
to investigate his case, DeKalb County officials informed the interns that all of
the evidence in Mr. Harrison's case had been destroyed. 2 In a last ditch attempt
to locate evidence, the interns combed through the box containing his case materials and eventually found a single slide of the rapist's semen from the victim's
rape kit. 23 Testing at an independent laboratory excluded Harrison as the perpetrator and a court later dismissed the charges. 24 Without the persistence of unpaid law students, Mr. Harrison would remain wrongfully incarcerated because
his evidence had been officially destroyed.
B.

Comparison of Georgia Statutes to the Model Policy

In order to ensure that defendants are provided access to the evidence used in
their convictions for use in post-conviction remedies, the model policy suggests
that states devise standards regarding custody of evidence in criminal cases, provide for sanctions and remedies when evidence is destroyed in violation of statutory provisions, and require the preservation of biological evidence throughout a
defendant's sentence.2 5

19 Innocence Project, Georgia Exonerations: Calvin Johnson, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/186.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2009).
20 Hans Sherrer, Innocent Georgia Man Exonerated of Rape, Kidnapping and Robbery After 17
Years Imprisonment, 28 JUSTICE: DENIED 18 (2005).
21 Innocence Project, Georgia Exonerations: Clarence Harrison, http://www.innocenceproject.
org/Contentl73.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2009).
22 Hans Sherrer, Innocent Georgia Man Exonerated of Rape, Kidnapping and Robbery After 17
Years Imprisonment,28 JUSTICE: DENIED 18 (2005).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, IMPROVING ACCESS TO POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING: A POLICY
REVIEW 23 (2008) [hereinafter JUSTICE PROJECT].
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1. Custody and Control of Evidence
The policy model suggests that, in addition to custodial requirements, standards relating to the proper collection and retention of evidence as well as training programs should be addressed by the legislature.2 6 Georgia law currently
prescribes the chain of custody required for physical evidence in criminal cases.
Specifically it mandates that the court designate a custodian of any property introduced into evidence during the pendency of a case and requires that an evidence log be created and maintained in order to establish a verifiable chain of
also allow for the appointed custodian to store
custody.2 7 The current statutes
28
and maintain the evidence.
Storage and collection methods are not addressed by the current statutes. Issues related to storage and preservation are addressed by the internal regulations
or policies of independent agencies within the criminal justice system. However,
evidence custodians should be statutorily required to ensure that the evidence is
identified, cataloged, preserved and stored under appropriate conditions by individuals with specialized training in preservation techniques. The custodians
should also ensure that evidence is readily available when requested.29
2. Enforcement Provisions
Destruction by governmental custodians creates a roadblock to the use of
DNA evidence in solving cold cases and exonerating the innocent. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that if evidence is "destroyed ... in good faith and in
accord with ... normal practices, it would be clear that their destruction did not

constitute an impermissible destruction of evidence nor deprive petitioner of any
right.",30 As late as 2004, the Court continued this reasoning when it upheld a
criminal conviction where evidence had been destroyed after ten years in police
possession.3 1 Therefore, defendants seeking access to evidence face an insurmountable burden in establishing the "bad faith" showing necessary for appropriate relief if the evidence is unavailable for DNA testing due to its destruction or
26

Id.

27

GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-55(a) (2009).

28 Id. (The statute specifically states that "the judge shall designate the clerk of court, the prosecuting attorney, or the law enforcement agency involved in prosecuting the case ... to store the
evidence").
29 JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 25, at 22 (the model policy specifically recommends that a
statewide task force composed of legislators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, academicians,
representatives of the GBI, and property clerks association be appointed to devise uniform custodial,
collection and training standards).
30 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 487 (1984) (citing Killian v. United States, 368 U.S.
231, 242 (1961)). See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (reasoning there is no due
process violation for failure to preserve exculpatory evidence in the absence of a showing of "bad
faith" by the State).
31 Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544 (2004).
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loss. While Georgia has made great strides in protecting the rights of defendants
by mandating the preservation of evidence in criminal cases, Georgia courts have
consistently complied with only those protections dictated by the federal courts
regarding constitutional due process violations relative to evidence
preservation. 32
On one occasion, the Georgia Supreme Court has taken the opportunity to
remind custodians of their statutory duties. 33 However, in all cases but one, no
sanctions have been imposed by Georgia appellate courts due to the state's failure to preserve evidence in criminal cases.34 Additionally, the statutes facially
contain no enforcement provision. This leaves a myriad of local jurisdictions, law
enforcement agencies and varied evidence custodians wide discretion regarding
35
the preservation of evidence.

Enforcement provisions, including criminal sanctions, should be specifically included in the statute to act as a deterrent to the premature disposal of evidence
that prevents continued access
to law enforcement agencies as well as the adjudi36
cation of innocence claims.
3.

Time Periods for Preservation

Given the length of time involved in post-conviction proceedings, especially
those seeking extraordinary remedies, evidence may be rightfully destroyed by
law enforcement agencies and crime laboratories, leaving innocent defendants
without recourse and the real perpetrators unanswerable for their crimes. 37 With

more than 242 exonerations nationwide and advances in forensic and DNA tech32 Lockheart v. State, 663 S.E.2d 213 (Ga. App. 2008) (citing Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547
(2004); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988)); Blackwood v. State, 627 S.E.2d 907 (Ga. App.
2006) (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988)); Champion v. State, 579 S.E.2d 35 (Ga. App.
2003) (citing Jones v. State, 574 S.E.2d 359, 360 (Ga. App. 2002) ("[i]n dealing with the failure of the
state to preserve evidence which might have exonerated the defendant, a court must determine both
whether the evidence was material and whether the police acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the
evidence").
33 In Phillips v. State, 604 S.E.2d 520, 529 n.6 (Ga. App. 2004), the Court opined: "We take this
opportunity to remind trial courts, clerks of court, law enforcement agencies, and other records' custodians across the state of their important statutory duties regarding preservation of evidence."
34 No sanctions have been granted in felony cases. The one exception to the imposition of
sanctions was a misdemeanor DUI case in which a urine sample was destroyed by the state crime
laboratory after notification that defendant has exerted his right to independent testing of the sample.
Given that the urine sample was the only evidence against the defendant, the trial court dismissed the
charges and the dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Georgia. See State v. Blackwell,
537 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. App. 2000).
35 Under Georgia law, the crime of tampering with evidence prevents a person from obstructing the prosecution or defense of any person by knowingly destroying or concealing physical
evidence. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-94 (2001) (emphasis added).
36 JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 25, at 23, 25
37 Innocence Project, Fact Sheets: Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2009). The Innocence Project,
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nology improving at a rapid pace, the preservation of evidence is of major importance to ensuring a fair and equitable criminal justice system.38
The current statute mandates that evidence in death penalty cases be maintained until the sentence is carried out; however, evidence relating to other
sentences need only be preserved until ten years after judgment in the case is
final or ten years after May 27, 2003, whichever is later. 39 Additionally, defendants may apply to the court of conviction for an order preserving evidence beyond the time period specified, provided the defendant is a party to an
extraordinary motion or habeas corpus action. 40 However, this request for additional time may only be extended until judgments in the above-noted actions are
final. 4 1 Evidence in sexual assault cases4 2must be maintained for ten years after
the report of the alleged sexual assault.
The average time spent in prison for the seven Georgia men later exonerated
through DNA testing was sixteen years, with multi-year lapses between pending
appeals - time counted as "final judgment" in the eyes of Georgia law.4 3 Therefore, the time limitations for preservation of evidence in non-death penalty cases
should be extended to include all felonies and preservation should be mandated
until completion of the defendant's sentence, including probation, parole and sex
offender registration. Evidence preservation until sentence completion is especially important given Georgia's restrictive statutory requirements for sex of-

fender registration, limited residential choices for all defendants convicted of a
sex-based offense, as well as lifetime registration requirements for some sexbased offenders. 44
4. Conviction Status
The policy model recommends that evidence be preserved throughout a defendant's sentence, regardless of the nature of the crime. 45 Georgia currently mandates that preservation of evidence is required only in defined "serious violent
felonies," specifically: murder, felony murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape,
whose clients have normally exhausted all available avenues of relief, states they have closed twentytwo percent of accepted cases since 2004 due to lost or missing evidence.
38 Id.
39 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-56(b) (2009).
40 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-55(c) (2009). The statutory scheme relating to appeals considers all
motions more than 30 days after a judgment by the trial court as "extraordinary motions." See GA.
CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(b) (2009).
41 GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(b) (2009).
42 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-71(a) (2009).
43 The Georgia Supreme Court has defined final judgment as "[when] the case is no longer
pending in the court below" and no motions for appeal are pending. State v. Clark, 615 S.E.2d 143
(Ga. App. 2005). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 5-6-34(a)(1).
44 See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a), (e); § 42-1-14(e); § 42-1-15(a), (c) (2009).
45

JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 25, at 3, 25
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statutory rape, bestiality, aggravated and non-aggravated child molestation, sodomy and sexual battery.4 6
However, many criminal defendants are convicted of other non-enumerated
felony offenses and these defendants should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prove their innocence of the crime for which they were convicted. 47 This
reasoning also applies to those convicted of sex-based misdemeanors for which
there may be significant collateral consequences.4 8
Il.

ACCESS TO POST CONVICTION

DNA

TESTING

A Florida state legislator recently said, "An innocent person in prison is the
greatest nightmare of those working within the criminal justice system. ' ' 49 Of the
individuals who have been exonerated through post-conviction DNA testing, seventeen of them served time on death row. 5 ° The model policy proposes that
states enact legislation prescribing that post-conviction testing be available to all
defendants asserting claims of innocence and that counsel be appointed for defendants seeking post-conviction testing. Furthermore it proposes that courts allow reasonable conditions regarding choice of laboratories, determine funding
sources for testing by indigent defendants, allow for appeal from denials of testing, and mandate procedures following the return of test results favorable to the
petitioner.5 1
A.

Availability of Post-Conviction Testing

The policy model proposes that all persons who assert they did not commit the
crime for which they are currently under sentence be granted access to post-con46 GA.

CODE ANN. § 17-5-56(b) (2009).
47 In a recent case, a defendant was convicted of incest; however, the defendant claimed that
had DNA testing been allowed, it would have shown that he and the victim were not related by blood
or marriage as required by the statute. Hunter v. State, 669 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. App. 2008). See also GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-22(a) (2009).
48 In 2006, in response to the case of Marcus Dixon, a high school football player convicted in
2003 of statutory rape and aggravated child molestation for consensual sex with a 15-year old classmate, the Georgia legislature enacted a so-called "Romeo and Juliet" provision to the child molestation statute, which specially states: "[i]f the victim is at least 14 but less than 16 years of age and the
person convicted of child molestation is 18 years of age or younger and is no more than four years
older than the victim, such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-6-4(b)(2)
(2009). See generally, Suzanne Smith Williams, Can't do the Time, Don't Do the Crime: Dixon v. State,
Statutory Construction, and the Harsh Realitites of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing in Georgia, 22
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 519, 521-22 (2005).
49 Henry M. Coxe III, Deoxyribonucleic Acid, Separation of Powers and Justice, 80 FLA. B.J. 6
(Aug. 2006) (statement of State Representative J.C. Planas to the Florida legislature during a debate
on pending legislation mandating the preservation of evidence and access to post-conviction DNA
testing).
50 Innocence Project, supra note 37.

51

JUSTICE PROJECT,

supra note 25, at 17-22, 25.
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viction DNA testing.5 2 Georgia law provides that a defendant seeking testing
may do so in a post-conviction motion for DNA testing; however, the law currently limits this remedy to only one such motion.5 3 This creates a significant risk
to those defendants whose innocence claims could not be established by 54further
DNA testing if they have previously requested relief under this remedy.
Due to limits on subsequent motions for DNA testing, Charles Chatman has a
sympathetic jurist to thank for his freedom. Chatman was recently exonerated in
Texas after serving twenty-seven years of a ninety-nine-year sentence for sexual
assault.55 His first request for DNA testing was filed in 2001 and granted in 2004,
but the results of the testing were inconclusive. 56 The remaining biological evidence was a very small sample and would be fully consumed in further testing; if
subsequent testing was inconclusive, Chatman would forego his chance at exoneration.57 The judge allowed Chatman's attorneys to "suspend" an extraordinary
motion to allow for technological advances in DNA testing. 58 The remaining
sample was finally tested in 2007 and conclusively eliminated Chatman as the
victim's attacker. 59 He was freed on January 2, 2008, yet spent an unnecessary,
not to mention patient, four additional years in prison in order to pursue his
60
claim of innocence.
1.

Status of Conviction

The model policy posits that post-conviction DNA testing should be allowed
by all defendants without regard to the status of their conviction or the nature of
the crime. 61 Limiting such access undermines the fundamental fairness and integrity of the criminal justice system.6 2 In Georgia, only those petitioners convicted of specified felony offenses may motion the court for post-conviction DNA
testing.63
52 Id. at 18.
53 GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(b) (2009) specifically states: "only one such extraordinary motion
shall be made or allowed."
54 GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c)(3)(B) (2009). To obtain relief, the defendant is required to make
a showing that the technological advances now available were not available at the time of trial. Id.
(emphasis added). Additionally, Code Section 5-5-41(c)(4)(B) requires the petitioner to state that
"the requested DNA testing was not ordered in a prior proceeding in any court ......
55 Kevin Johnson, DNA Tests Fuel Urgency to Free the Innocent, USA TODAY, Feb. 19, 2008,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-02-18-dnaN.htm.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59
60
61

Johnson, supra note 55.
Id.
JusTIcE PROJECT, supra note 25, at 18. 25.

62 Id.
63 GA. CODE AN. § 5-5-41(c)(1) (2009). The felony offenses, the so-called "seven deadly
sins", as defined by Code Section §17-10-6.1. are: murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggra-
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In November 2008, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's denial of post-conviction testing to a petitioner, who pled guilty to the charge of
incest, sentenced to a term of twenty years. 64 The Court reasoned that the petitioner was barred from requesting DNA testing under the statute because the
crime of incest is not defined by the statute as a serious violent felony; therefore,
he failed to meet even the initial statutory requirement for filing such a motion.65
Additionally, post-conviction testing in Georgia is limited to those individuals
who were convicted at trial.66 As such, the statutory scheme fails to provide a
remedy for individuals who pled guilty, including those under Alford v. North
Carolina,or those who plead nolo contendere.6 7 In 2004, the Missouri Supreme
Court ordered the state to conduct a DNA test for a defendant who pled guilty to
rape in 1992, stating, "a person who pleaded guilty is not somehow 'more' guilty,
or less deserving of a chance to show actual innocence than one who went to
trial.",68 In fact, according to available exoneration statistics, eleven individuals
69
later proven innocent through post-conviction DNA testing initially pled guilty.
2. Special Considerations in Death Sentences
While it is human nature to exhibit revulsion to heinous crimes, the legal system seeks justice and must work to ensure that only those who are actually guilty
are put to death at the hands of the state. Georgia courts denied post-conviction
DNA testing to Eddie Crawford, accused of the rape and murder of his niece in
1983, and convicted and sentenced him to death in 1984.70 The appellate court
overturned his conviction and he was retried, convicted and sentenced to death in
1987.71
vated child molestation, aggravated sodomy and aggravated battery. See GA. CODE ANN. §17-106.1(a)(1)-(7) (2009).
64 Hunter v. State, 669 S.E.2d 533 (Ga.App. 2008).
65 Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c)(1)).
66 GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c)(3)(B) requires the petitioner to show that "[t]he evidence was
not subjected to the requested DNA testing because the existence of the evidence was unknown to
the petitioner or to the petitioner's trial attorney prior to trial or because the technology for the
testing was not available at the time of trial." (emphasis added).
67 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (an individual accused of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly and understandingly consent to the imposition of prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in acts constituting the crime).
68 Weeks v. State, 140 S.W.3d 39, 46 (Mo. 2004) (rejecting the state's argument which was
premised on the assumption that all those who plead guilty are in fact guilty).
69 Innocence Project, Fact Sheet: Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/304.php# (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
70 Crawford v. State, 597 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. 2004). Crawford was the first defendant to motion
the court for extraordinary relief following adoption of the Georgia statute authorizing post-conviction DNA testing.
71 Id. at 403.
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Crawford filed a request for post-conviction DNA testing in 2003 and the request was denied without a hearing by the trial court. 72 The trial court stated that
Crawford did not meet the legal standards required for DNA testing and the
Supreme Court of Georgia later affirmed this denial .7
Crawford's defense at trial was that someone else had committed the crime
and other persons with access to the child on the night of crime had a history of
sexually abusing children.74 There was a significant amount of evidence at trial;
including a blanket found with the child, bed linens and trousers belonging to
another individual, that were not tested for DNA at the time of Crawford's trial
because DNA technology was not then available.75 The trial court's denial of
DNA testing focused primarily on Crawford's confession.76 Yet, approximately
twenty-five percent of wrongful convictions have been attributed to false confessions by defendants.77
With an execution date looming, non-profit organizations offered to pay for
the testing if a stay was granted long enough for it to be conducted. 78 They were
refused and Crawford was executed in 2004. 7 ' Doubts linger concerning Crawford's guilt because he was not allowed the opportunity to conduct DNA testing
despite its relatively low cost.8 °
B.

Legal Standardsfor Testing Access

The model policy recommends the standards for securing testing of DNA related to a criminal conviction: that the DNA evidence is materially relevant to a
claim of innocence or reduced culpability for the challenged conviction; that the
evidence to be tested still exists and the chain of custody has been maintained;
that the evidence in question was not previously tested or was previously tested
but is now subject to testing using new methods or technologies; and that the
request is not made for the purpose of unreasonable delay. 81 For the most part,
72 Id.
73 Id. at 404 (reasoning that since Crawford confessed to the crime, his identity was not a significant issue at trial).
74 Id. at 407 (Fletcher, C.J., dissenting) (discussing evidence posited by Crawford that should
have mandated a hearing by the trial court).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 408.
77 Innocence Project, Fact Sheet: False Confessions & Recording Of Custodial Interrogations,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/314.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
78 Shaila K. Dewan, Georgia Case Tests Reach Of Appeals Based on DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 19,
2004, at All.
79 Carlos Campos, Execution 'Worth It' For Family, Killer Says, ATL. J. CONST., Jul. 20, 2004, at
B3.
80 Charles Montaldo, Doubts Remain After Crawford Execution in Georgia: New DNA Evidence Could Point to Other Suspects, http://crime.about.com/od/death/a/crawford0407l9.htm (last visited Jul. 19, 2004).
81

JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 25, at 18.
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Georgia's statutory scheme comports with the suggested portions of the policy
model.
Georgia law currently limits the availability of post-conviction DNA testing to
petitioners who demonstrate the following: that the evidence to be subjected to
DNA testing is related to the crime that resulted in conviction; that such evidence
was not previously tested because it was not known to the defendant or because
the technology was not available; and that DNA testing results would raise a
"reasonable probability" that the petitioner would have been acquitted if the
testing results were available at trial.8 2
The statute includes an additional requirement that any petitioner show that
the identity of the perpetrator was, or should have been, a significant issue in the
case. 83 As the majority of post-conviction requests for DNA testing have been
made by petitioners convicted of sexual offenses, primarily rape and statutory
rape, this additional statutory requirement may be responsible for the low number of requests from defendants whose defense theory at trial was the consent of
84
the victim.
Defendants must also demonstrate a verifiable chain of custody, provide the
court with the location, origin and means of the collection of the original evidence, and advise the court of any testing previously conducted. 85
Given the vetting requirements of the statute, there is no indication that trial
courts in Georgia have been overwhelmed with requests for DNA testing since
the statute was enacted in 2003.86 However, as a precaution against petitions
made by defendants whose test results are likely to confirm their guilt, which in
turn would result in delays for DNA testing concerning claims of actual innocence, the Georgia legislature should enact penalties to prevent a flood of postconviction testing motions from this population.8 7 Such penalties should include
monetary sanctions, additional incarceration or revocation of earned "good time"
88
credits.
82 GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c)(3)(A), (B), (D) (2009).
83 GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c)(3)(C) (2009).
84 The Georgia Supreme Court confirmed this view in a recent case where the petitioner was
convicted of rape and aggravated sodomy in 1983. Twenty-two years later, the defendant filed a
motion for DNA testing and the Court held that, since he admitted to having sex with the victim on
the night in question, his identity was not a significant issue at his trial; the significant issue at trial was
that of the consent of the victim. Williams v. State, 658 S.E.2d 446 (Ga. App. 2008).
85 GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c)(3)(E), (G) (2009).
86 Only six denials by trial courts, discussed later in detail, have been entertained on appeal by
the Georgia appellate courts. As most petitioners with claims of innocence would likely appeal a
denial by the trial court, coupled with the stringent legal requirements of the post-conviction DNA
testing statute and the lack of access to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, there is little evidence
to suggest that trial courts have been overwhelmed by requests for testing.
87 Tonya Jacobi & Gwendolyn Carroll, Acknowledging Guilt: ForcingSelf-Identification in PostConviction DNA Testing, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 263, 264 (2008).
88 Id. at 293-94.
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C. Appointment of Counsel

Few of those convicted and imprisoned have access to adequate legal information and assistance concerning their rights regarding the testing of evidence following conviction. This is especially true for those engaged in the complex task
of seeking a post-conviction remedy such as access to DNA testing. Additionally,
as previously discussed, the state mandates a time limitation on the preservation
of evidence in criminal cases. If defendants are required to wade through the

maze of both evidence preservation restrictions and post-conviction proceedings
without legal counsel, the evidence may be destroyed prior to the defendant's
ability to petition the court for testing. For this reason, the policy model suggests

that states provide counsel to ensure the adequate
representation of those seek89
ing access to post-conviction DNA testing.

In Georgia, petitioners in post-convictions proceedings are not entitled to the
appointment of counsel. 90 Therefore, those seeking testing must rely on already

over-burdened non-profit organizations that focus on claims of innocence. In its
six year existence, the Georgia Innocence Project has received more than 3,600
requests for post-conviction assistance, but has been limited by resources and
strict case compliance reviews. 91 To date, the organization, the only one of its
kind in Georgia, has accepted only twenty-one clients. 92 Additionally, in ex-

tremely limited circumstances, the Southern Center for Human Rights provides
93
assistance to those who are currently on death row in Georgia and Alabama.

The criminal justice system in Georgia should seek justice and not be limited
solely to seeking convictions based on numbers. Therefore, defendants should be

given an opportunity to prove their innocence, which is unlikely to occur without
legal advice given the complex nature of the post-conviction DNA testing statute.9 4 By providing access to appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings,

specifically in claims of actual innocence, the state can limit the number of wrongful convictions, ensure that only those who are truly guilty remain sentenced and
89 JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 25, at 19.
90 Crawford v. State, 597 S.E.2d 403, 407 (Ga. 2004) (Fletcher, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "a
petitioner seeking post-conviction DNA testing most often will not have counsel because the statute
does not authorize the appointment of counsel"). See also Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186 (Ga.1999)
(no right to counsel beyond direct appeal).
91 Georgia Innocence Project - History, http://www.ga-innocenceproject.org/history.html. The
organization does not take cases where a defendant is still eligible for appointed counsel, where the
identity of the perpetrator is not at issue, and where there is lack of DNA evidence.
92 Id. Given the current economic climate and the associated decreasing donations to nonprofit organizations, the outlook is even bleaker for those individuals seeking assistance from regional
Innocence Project offices.
93 Southern Center for Human Rights, http://www.schr.org/deathpenalty/index.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
94 In his dissent in Crawford v. State, 597 S.E.2d 403, 406 (Ga. 2004), Georgia Supreme Court
Chief Justice Fletcher opined, "The language of the statute is, admittedly, a little confusing ... "
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imprisoned as well as allow law enforcement agencies the opportunity to locate
the true perpetrator of the crime.
D. Payment for Testing

The Justice Project proposes that testing, if ordered, be conducted by state
laboratories and paid for by the state.95 Additionally, the policy model suggests
be determined by
that payment methods for independent testing, if9 requested,
6
the court, based on the petitioner's ability to pay.
The Georgia statute mandates that courts determine the method of payment
for the cost of testing and may require that it be paid from private funds if possible. 97 If the petitioner is indigent, the costs are paid from the state's "fine and
forfeiture fund.",98 Therefore, Georgia law does not limit access to post-conviction testing based on a petitioner's financial circumstances.
E.

Choice of Laboratory

The model policy recommends that post-conviction testing of evidence be conducted by a mutually agreeable facility and that the court impose reasonable conditions on testing to protect each party's interest in the integrity of the evidence
and the testing process. 99 Under the current statute, testing must be conducted

by the state laboratory at Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) headquarters
and a sample of the petitioner's DNA must be submitted to the Forensic Science
Division of the GBI for inclusion in the state's DNA data bank. 1°°
Additional testing by an independent laboratory may also be ordered if the
laboratory meets the accreditation standards established by the DNA Identification Act of 1994.101 The Georgia Supreme Court has previously disallowed inde-

pendent testing by an uncertified laboratory, though the laboratory in question
employed some of the most preeminent analysts in the fields of criminology and
DNA testing, and when petitioner's counsel offered to pay for the cost of the
testing.

10 2

95
96

JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 25, at 20.
Id.

97

GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c)(8) (2009).

98 Id. The statute specifically states "[i]f petitioner is indigent, the cost shall be paid from the
fine and forfeiture fund as provided in Article 3 of Chapter 5 of Title 15"; however, effective July 1,
2008, payments from the fund are provided for in newly-enacted Code § 15-21-5.
99 JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 25, at 20.
100 GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c)(9) (2009).
101 The DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.A. 14131(a) (1994), contained in the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, provides for a national DNA advisory committee
to recommend quality assurance methods, including standards for proficiency testing, for local, state
and federal crime laboratories conducting DNA analyses.
102 Dr. Edward Blake, specifically named in the Court's opinion in State v. Clark, is a partner
at Forensic Science Associates (FSA), an independent forensic consulting firm in California, and a
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Given the backlog of cases at state-run laboratories, petitioners should be provided with reasonable choices regarding requests for post-conviction DNA testing.0 3 Allowing a choice of laboratories will also ensure the objectivity and
reliability of evidence testing by allowing testing to be conducted by 1laboratories
°4

not under the control of law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies.
F. Appeals from Denial of Testing

The model policy states that petitioners should have the right to appeal any
decision that denies post-conviction DNA testing. 105 Georgia law allows both the
State and the petitioner to appeal a denial of a motion for post-conviction DNA
testing. 10 6 To date, only six appellate cases have been entertained by the Georgia

Supreme Court: one appeal by the State and five by defendants. 0 7

legend in the field of DNA analysis in criminal cases for over 35 years. In the trial court, it was
"undisputed that [FSA]... has never been certified because Dr. Blake made a personal decision that it
would not be certified"; however, the trial court ordered the test conducted. State v. Clark, 615
S.E.2d 143, 145 (Ga.App. 2005). On appeal by the State, the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded
that the trial court had "no discretion to ignore the statutory mandate" when it approved independent
testing by FSA. Id. at 147.
103 According to the Forensic Sciences Division of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, the
most current statistics indicate that the waiting period for results of DNA testing in most cases is 30
days. Tim Shurrock, GBI Lab Trims Backlog, MACON TELEGRAPH (Jul. 3, 2006), available at http://
dofs.gbi.georgia.gov/00/article/0,2086,75166109_75684228_75775092,00.html.
104 In 2007, the Maryland General Assembly enacted legislation, the first of its kind in the
nation, assigning oversight of all forensic laboratories in the state to the Maryland Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene, which currently oversees hospital laboratories, by 2011. The legislation
removed oversight of Maryland's municipal, county and state crime laboratories from the Maryland
State Police in order to protect the integrity of the forensic science process and create a separation
between law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies and other participants in the criminal justice
system.

See generally MD. CODE ANN. - HEALTH-GEN. §§ 17-2A-01 to -12 (2009). See also Julie

Bykowitz, Dubious Science: Carelessness in Crime Lab Procedures Raises Serious Questions About
Evidence, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 7, 2008, at lB.
105
106

JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 25, at 21.
GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c)(13) (2009).

107 The State appealed in State v. Clark, 615 S.E.2d 143 (Ga.App. 2005) (citing errors in the
trial court's failure to mandate entry of DNA into the state's data bank and authorization of testing by
uncertified laboratory). Clark was granted post-conviction testing and exonerated by the results in
2005 after serving 23 1hyears of a life sentence for rape, kidnapping and armed robbery. Innocence
Project, Georgia Exonerations: Robert Clark, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/71.php (last
visited Sept. 26, 2009). Appeals by petitioners include: Hunter v. State, 669 S.E.2d 533 (Ga.App. 2008)
(petitioner convicted of crime not set forth in statute as one eligible for post-conviction DNA testing);
Pate v. State, 665 S.E.2d 907 (Ga.App. 2008) (remand necessary so trial court could enter written
order setting forth denial); Williams v. State, 658 S.E.2d 446 (Ga.App. 2008) (identity of the perpetrator not a significant issue at trial); Palmer v. State, 650 S.E.2d 255 (Ga.App. 2007) (in a motion for
new trial, trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to hire a DNA expert
of his choosing to test evidence); Crawford v. State, 597 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. 2004) (petitioner could not
demonstrate a reasonable probability that DNA testing results would have effected the outcome of
his trial).
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Procedure Following Favorable DNA Testing Results

Petitioners may remain incarcerated following favorable post-conviction testing results, thus resulting in further delays of fairness in the justice system.
Therefore, the policy model recommends that states enact procedures that dictate
the actions courts are required to take to determine appropriate relief when
DNA testing results are favorable to the petitioner.108 Under Georgia law, the
post-conviction process requires a petitioner to make an extraordinary motion for
new trial to the court of conviction in order to secure a hearing following
favorable DNA testing results and the court must afford the State twenty days in
which to respond. 0 9
Most recently, when notification of favorable testing results is received, the
district attorneys overseeing such cases have been reluctant to continue incarceration of petitioners with claims of innocence and favorable DNA testing results.1 10 These actions reflect the ability of the state crime laboratory to quickly
perform and verify testing results and enter the information into the state's offender DNA databank, allowing them to more quickly identify the true perpetrators if they have been previously convicted of a crime. 11' Furthermore,
organizations focused on wrongful convictions now have the Internet and twentyfour-hour media access to the criminal justice system in addition to attorneys who
112
are not reluctant in using such media to their advantage.

IV.

THE COST VS. BENEFIT ANALYSIS

The cost of DNA testing is relatively inexpensive; normally $25 to $110 per
case for testing performed at state crime laboratories and $425 to $1,720 per case
for testing at independent laboratories, depending on the amount of evidence to
108

JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 25, at 21-22.

109 GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(a) specifically states: "When a motion for a new trial is made after
the expiration of a 30 day period from the entry of judgment, some good reason must be shown why
the motion was not made during such period, which reason shall be judged by the court. In all such
cases, 20 days' notice shall be given to the opposite party."
110 Calvin Johnson, the first man exonerated in Georgia in 1999, was incarcerated for an additional six months following the return of favorable testing results. The most recent, John Jerome
White, exonerated in 2007, spent less than four days of incarceration following his favorable test
results. Innocence Project, Georgia Exonerations: Calvin Johnson, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/186.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
111 The real perpetrators have been identified in two of Georgia's wrongful conviction cases Robert Clark and John Jerome White. The Innocence Project, Georgia Exonerations, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/news/state.php?state=GA (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
112 Television programs like NBC's Dateline, CBS's 48 Hours, ABC's 20/20, A&E's American
Justice, CNN programming and others abound with timely stories of claims of wrongful conviction as
well as exonerations. A recent search of the West database, using the term "wrongful conviction",
returned more than 3000 stories from major news services for the preceding three years.

POST-CONVICTION DNA & PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE

be tested.1 13 States spend an average of $22,650 per year to house a single inmate
in the prison system. 11" Recent studies in Maryland and Florida place the cost of
case and housing an inmate on death row at an averprosecuting a death penalty 15
age of $3 million per case.'
Given the low cost of DNA testing and the increased cost of compensation of
the wrongfully convicted, it may be a more efficient use of state resources to
allow petitioners greater access to post-conviction DNA testing. The continued
through access to
incarceration of those inmates who may be proven innocent
16
resources.
state
of
waste
a
is
testing
post conviction
CONCLUSION

The Georgia legislature should be applauded for their past work in enacting
statutes concerning the preservation of evidence and access to post-conviction
DNA testing. However, many more defendants with claims of innocence are now
incarcerated in Georgia's prisons and access to DNA testing may provide them
with the only remedy to prove their claims. Although the concept of finality is
respected in the criminal justice system, victims and law enforcement agencies do
not have true finality if the true persons who committed these crimes remain
unanswerable for their actions. The citizens of Georgia deserve faith and reassurance that their criminal justice system incarcerates, and perhaps even executes,
only those who are guilty of their crimes.
Wrongful convictions have many causes including: false confessions, erroneous
eyewitness identifications, unreliable informant testimony, and faulty forensic science. Regardless of the causes of wrongful convictions, it has been demonstrated
that our criminal justice system can overcome these errors by providing defendants with access to post-conviction DNA testing; especially when such access may
be the only avenue for defendants with claims of actual innocence. Yet, access to
DNA testing becomes irrelevant if the evidence used in the conviction is not
113

N.C. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, COST STUDY OF DNA ANALYSIS AND TESTING 7, 8 (2006).

114 BUREAU OF JUSTICE
TURES 1 (2004).
115 JOHN ROMAN ET AL.,

STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 2001 STATE PRISON EXPENDI-

COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND 2 (Urban Institute for
Justice, 2008); The High Price Of Killing Killers: Death Penalty Prosecutions Cost Taxpayers Millions
Annually, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 4, 2000, at lA.

116 To date, the Georgia General Assembly has authorized $3.9 million in compensation for the
wrongful imprisonment of three individuals - Robert Clark, Willie Otis Williams, Clarence Harrison
and John Jerome White. Although several resolutions have been introduced by the Georgia legislature, Douglas Echols and Samuel Scott have not yet been compensated foe their wrongful convictions. Perdue Approves $500K for Wrongfully Convicted Man, ATL. J. CONST., May 9, 2009, available
at

http://www.ajc.com/services/content/metro/stories/2009/05/06/georgia-exonerate-compensation.

html?cxtype=rss&cxsvc=7&cxcat=13; Cynthia Tucker, The Incalculable Price of Faulty Eyewitness
IDs, ATE. J. CONST., Mar. 5, 2008, at A20; House OKs Wrongful Imprisonment Award, AUGUSTA
CHRONICLE, Mar. 20, 2007, at B06.
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available for testing. It is within the power of Georgia's elected representatives
to clear the way to reducing wrongful convictions and exonerations, as well as
locating the actual perpetrators of crime by enacting additional safeguards for
evidence preservation and for increasing the access to post-conviction testing.
We can only request that they use their power to do so.

